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PRESIDENT'S NOTES 
As the 1975-76 academic year draws 
to a close, it seems most appropriate to 
reflect briefly on what the College is, 
what it does, and where it is going. 
First of all, the College is today-as it 
has been since 1884-the Navy's senior 
institution dedicated to the advanced 
professional military education of care­
fully selected naval officers who spend 
10 months here in the company of 
outstanding colleagues from the other 
services and from other nations. The 
College's business, like that of other 
graduate-level institutions, is teaching 
and research. We seek to expand the 
horizons of the competent professionals 
who attend the College and to improve 
their ability to deal with today's com­
plex problems in an environment char­
acterized by uncertainty and rapid 
change. 
I have been very pleased with the 
results achieved by our faculty in 
presenting a curriculum of high profes­
sional usefulness. In this exciting 
process everyone-student, faculty, and 
staff-learns and is enriched by an �x­
change of views and by the challenges to 
and defense of those views. 
While the rigorous academic program 
we offer the students is our main line of 
endeavor, research and publication are 
also vital to the academic life of this 
institution. The Center for Advanced 
Research was opened in March 1975 by 
the Secretary of the Navy who enthusi­
astically supported the idea of such a 
center. Research is performed by stu­
dents (Research Associates), former stu­
dents at the Naval War College (Gradu­
ate Fellows), and others on a wide 
variety of topics focusing upon tactical 
and strategic concepts. Among our 
initial projects was a study by Edward 
Luttwak, the first third of which The 
Johns Hopkins University Press has 
published as The Political Uses of Sea 
Power. More recently, the HARPOON 
Tactical Employment Study, conducted 
by students, has attracted wide Navy 
interest and has proven highly useful in 
tactical development. 
In addition, the Naval War College 
Historical Monograph Series was inaugu­
rated in 1975. The first in what we hope 
will be a productive and stimulating 
series is a paper entitled The Writings of 
Stephen B. Luce by John D. Hayes and 
John Hattendorf. Both Luce, the 
founding President of the Naval War 
College, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, his 
successor, believed that a knowledge of 
history held the key to a comprehensive 
understanding of the "principles" of the 
"art and science" of naval warfare. 
Mahan's writings, based in part on his 
lectures here, have achieved an enduring 
fame. The Writings of Stephen B. Luce 
show that he, as well as Mahan, was one 
of the great creative thinkers and 
dynamic innovators of his time. I am 
happy to say that this volume has been 
5
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All too frequently considerations of the use of naval power as an instrument of 
foreign policy dwell on its positive results without adequate consideration of its 
costs. A fundamental step in sound military planning is determination of aooepta• 
bility-what is the objective worth to me and what is its projected cost in political, 
materiel, and personnel terms? Ken Booth discusses some of the political costs 
Involved in the peacetime use of naval power. These costs and problems can be 
ignored only at our peril. His conclusions In regard to the Soviet Navy are rather 
startling. 
FOREIGN POLICIES AT RISK: 
SOME PROBLEMS OF MANAGING NAVAL POWER 
by 
ProfeBSor Ken Booth 
To know the pain of power, we 
must go to those who have it; to 
know Its pleasures, we must go to 
those who are seeking it; the pains 
of power are real1 its pleasures 
imaginary. 
Charles C. Colton 
Lacon (1823) 
The aim of this essay is to show that 
naval power can be an unfortunate 
influence on foreign policy as well as a 
useful instrumentj that naval power can 
contribute to the distortion of foreign 
policy, as well as to its support; that it 
can be the vehicle for irrational as well 
as rational behavior; and that it can bite 
the hand that feeds it, as well as snarling 
at adversaries. The essay is an attempt 
to present the other side of the coin to 
Copyright @ 1976 by Kon Booth, 
the neo•Clausewitzian emphasis on 
clinical instrumentality, in whlch armed 
forces are conceived in terms of the 
clear-cut missions which they perform 
in the pursuit of political goals. 
The picture to be presented is en• 
tirely and deliberately one-sided, but it 
ls an approach which has several values: 
(l) By aggregating certain types of naval
behavior, it might help to clarify some
of the inherent problems of using navies
as instruments of policy in distant
regions. (2) In so doing it may con­
tribute to the debate about the utility
of navies. This debate often polarizes
the relatively straightforward concepts
of naval missions as against the oppor•
tunity costs of maintaining expensive
warships. In this polarization, political
costs, which are often indirect, un­
certain, and fuzzy, tend to be ignored.
(3) By articulating some of the major
problems of managing naval power, it
7
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16 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 
All too often consideration of questions of logistics is deferred in favor of the 
more glamorous and more exciting questions of strategy and tactics. Even so, the 
task of logistics is to provide, train
1 equip, and maintain miHtary forces capable of
conductlng sustained combat operations. For this reason logistics establishes very real 
limitations to what strategy can accomplish, and at all times it must be a personal 
concern of commanders at all levels. Writing on the basis of his experience at the 
highest operational and staff levels, Vice Admiral Weschler, in a letter to the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), discusses some funda­
mentals, current problems, and future prospects of logistics. Some of his recommen­
dations are sure to excite discussion. 
PRIORITIES AND EMPHASES FOR LOGISTICS, 1976-78 
by 
Vire Admiral Thomas R. Wcschlcr, U.S. Navy (Ret.) 
Dr. John J. Bennett 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Logistics) 
Room 3E808 
The Pentagon 
Washington, D.C. 20351 
Dear Dr. Bennett: 
You have asked me to examine today's logistics principles and precepts 
and then, in the light of current opportunities or limitations, to indicate what 
steps could be taken to bring abou!'the best possible logistics improvement. 
First, as to the principles of logistics, the best discussion is Henry E. Eccles' 
classic Logistics in the National Defense. *There are also valuable lists 
published by the Joint Logistics Commanders in 1967 and again in the 
Logistics Systems Plan "LOGPLAN FY 75•81." 
Logb;tics in the National Defense is so comprehensive as to be a textbook 
and is based on the author's own firsthand logistics experience in World War 
11. It is a distiliation of the fundamentals of logistics and logistics' place in the
military scheme. Thus, it is as relevant today as it was nearly 20 years ago.
Four basic points have been developed from this and other sources:
*Henry E. Eccles, Logistics fo the National Defense {Harrisburg, Pa,: Stackpole,
1959). 
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30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 
Power is an elusive quantity, incapable of being quantified in purely numerical 
terms. Rather, it is a derivative of the perceptions of power. For this reason, trends 
relating to the waxing or waning of strength and determination and how they are 
perceived by oneself, friend,, and enemies are crucially important. Professor Ra'anan 
takes im;ue with the minimalists who view the increase of Soviet naval power as 
motivated primarily by Soviet defensive considerations. Instead, he argues strongly 
that the Soviet Union, recognizing the limitations nuclear weapons have imposed 
upon direct conflict with the West, now seeks unilateral gains in the Third World by 
the use of surrogates. The Cuban involvement in Angola is only the most recent 
example. 
TIIE SOVIET VIEW 
OF NAVIES IN PEACETIME 
based on a lecture 
by 
Professor Uri Ra 'anan 
It may be helpful to start by at­
tempting to place this topic within its 
proper parameters: that is, to focus 
upon the issue of pereeptions, as viewed 
by theoreticians and policymakers alike 
within the Soviet Union and, hopefully, 
if one can educate Western analyst,, 
outside the U.S.S.R. as well. The reason 
for this emphasis is that the concept of 
perceptions relates to the crux of the 
great ngame" of international comped� 
tion and conflict. 
I had the honor, some 4½ years ago, 
to be asked by the Senate Subcom• 
mittee on National Security and Inter­
national Operations (of the Committee 
on Government Operations) to prepare 
an evaluation of the power balance 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. That particular task raised 
in my mind some conceptual and 
methodological questions, in response 
to which I developed a theory or, if you 
prefer, an equation. Although published 
by the Senate some 4 years ago, my 
conclusions appear to have been uredis­
covered11 recently. 
My main point was that the leader­
ship of the Soviet Union, as evidenced 
by the extensive defense and political 
literature printed in that country, has 
identified power, quite correctly, as a 
derivative of perceptions of power. This 
means that there are no 11concrete/' 
objective factors that, without further 
refinement and qualification, can be 
equated, as such, with "power" �i.e., no 
purely numerical, quantifiable elements. 
Rather, the power of an "actor" on the 
international scene (usually a state) 
-that is to say, its ability to influence
others and also its own evaluation of 
what it may be capable of doing to
influence others-is a function both of
its perception and of its adversary's
perception of what either is able and
willing to do. That perception may or
may not be re lated directly to the
objective, numerical power factors that
can be measured and quantified.
Who are the "customers,i to whom a 
perception of power has to be conveyed 
in order to achieve the degree of in• 
fluence required by any regime? They 
34
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The Yam Kippur War of 1976 has proven to be a fertile source of analyses and 
commentaries, One of its striking features was that, unlike 1956 and 1967, Israel did 
not initiate hostilities because Israeli Government decisionmakers assumed that the 
Egyptians would not attack first since they could not "win," Major McKenzie-Smith 
analyzes the Israeli decision to forbear a preemptive attack in light of the 
surrounding circumstances. He concludes that the decision itself was rational, but 
more important, he points out that rationality does not necessarily preclude error, 
CRISIS DECISIONMAKING IN ISRAEL: 
THE CASE OF THE OCTOBER 1973 
MIDDLE EAST WAR 
by 
Major Robert H. McKenzie-Smith, U.S. Army 
The Israeli Government, facing the 
crisis which led to the October 1973 
Middle East war, developed strategic 
solutions markedly different from those 
developed in both 1956 and 1967 in at 
least two significant respects. Both in 
1956 and 1967 Israel was the initiator 
of at least the physical hostilities, In 
October 1973 the Israeli Government 
deliberately chose not to employ the 
tactic of preemptive attack which earlier 
governments had used in both 1956 and 
l 967 and which had, in fact, become
institutionalized as a part of the politi­
cal-mili tary doctrine of the state. In
addition, in October 1973 the Israeli
Government declined to order mobiliza­
tion of the large reserve contingents of
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) until
just hours before the beginning of the
coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attack
on Yorn Kippur, the Day of Atonement,
6 October 1973,
These two critical decisions merit 
examination and study, In light of the 
political and military outcomes of the 
October war, these decisions can be seen 
either as the value-maximizing choices 
of rational political-military decision­
makers of a government under wartime 
duress1 or they can be seen, as critics of 
the 1973 Meir government have called 
them, as decisionmaking errors. 
If rational, the October 1973 deci­
sions to forbear preemptive attack and 
to delay mobilization should appear as 
deliberately taken in expectation of 
certain positive political outcomes and 
taken within the context of some per­
ception of cost. Conversely, if seen as 
decision errors, some misappreciation of 
the imperfect information which charac­
terizes decisionmaking under un� 
certainty should be apparent. 
As in all states, in Israel certain 
political-military doctrines have evolved 43
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At the end of World War II, military planners realized that domestic U.S. oil 
reserves would be insufficient in the event of another war. The result was that 
planners began to address the problem of how to safeguard Middle East, and 
particularly Persian Gulf, petroleum sources as early as the autumn of 1945. Using 
recently declassified documents, David Rosenberg points out that strategic concerns 
about oil supply are not new. More important, he describes the outlook of American 
military planners in view of their perception of the Soviet threat and limited U.S. 
capabilities as a result of budget outs in the early years of the cold war. 
THE U.S. NA VY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF OIL IN A FUTURE WAR: 
THE OUTLINE OF A STRATEGIC DILEMMA, 1945-1950 
by 
David Alan Rosenberg 
During late 1974 and early 1975, 
reports appeared in such publications as 
Time, Newsweek, and Harper's de­
scribing in detail how the United States 
might, in the event of another oil 
embargo, militarily intervene to seize 
Arab oilfields in order to ensure access 
to that essential commodity. The re­
ports were generally dismissed by senior 
American policymakers. 1 While it re­
mains to be seen whether the military 
option will be exercised in the Persian 
Gulf of the l 970's, recently declassified 
documents from the late l 940's indicate 
that speculation about American mili• 
tary action in that area is not a recent 
development. Between 1947 and 1950, 
American strategic planners, in particu­
lar Navy strategists in Washington and 
Europe, were deeply concerned about 
the possibility of losing Middle Eastern 
oil resources to a powerful Russian 
enemy in the event of war. The plans 
that were prepared and debated within 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the opera• 
tions that the Navy conducted to meet 
such a threat are described in this 
paper? 
The first serious recognition by the 
United States of the strategic im­
portance of the Middle East and its oil 
reserves occurred during World War 11. 
While American businessmen, mis­
sionaries I and naval officers had been 
involved with the Arab world of the 
Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean 
since the birth of the republic; it took 
the emergence of modem military 
technology with its enormous de­
pendence on oil to force American 
officials to consider the area one of 
prime importance. The complex nego­
tiations which took place from 1943 to 
1945 among the U.S. Government, the 57
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PORTUGAL: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
IN THE CREATION OF A NEW REGIME 
Th• collapse of the Salazar-Caetano regime jn Portugal in 1974 was followed by a 
rapid and seemingly precipitate end to the ancient and extensive Portuguese colonial 
empire in Africa. In addition, Portugal Uself has experienced a political ferment in 
which the military forces, Communists, Socialists, and others have all sought to bring 
about one or another form of political order. In this exam/natfon of the Portuguese 
revolution, Professor Bruneau is guardedly optimistic that democracy may yet be the 
result of this complex political process. 
by 
Professor Thomas C. Bruneau 
If the overwhelming majority of for• 
eign observers were surprised but en• 
couraged by the coup of 25 April 1974 
which signaled an end to the Salazar· 
Caetano regime, the responses to devel• 
opments since that time have been 
mixed. In part this ambivalence can be 
attributed to the developments them• 
selves which are both difficult to com• 
prehend and almost impossible to place 
in a fixed context. Indeed, there is no 
fixed context. Not only have the 
boundaries of the Portuguese state 
changed radically with the independ• 
ence of the Afri can colonies and could 
change even more if the threatened 
independence of the Atlantic islands 
comes to pass, but the nature and even 
the tendencies of the Portuguese 
political system have been volatile and 
Copyright @ 1976 by Thomas C. Bruneau. 
contradictory. The center of the po• 
litical spectrum has shifted wildly from 
one side to the other, mainly in a 
reactive manner, and the observer has 
been treated to a whole series of 
seemingly mutually antagonistic po• 
litioal solutions to the "Portuguese 
crisis. 11 That there is a crisis is obvious, 
for not only must the Portuguese re• 
cover from an extremely rapid decoloni• 
zation and determine the nature of their 
economic system, but they must further 
resolve the crucial questions of legiti• 
macy, the role of the masses, and the 
state in a very short period of time. 
What took centuries in the rest of 
Western Europe must be confronted in 
Portugal immediately, and while the 
ideas are now present for a resolution of 
these problems the socioeconomic 
69
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83 
Napoleon Bonaparte's spectacular and dazzling series of victories not only made 
him for a while the master of continental Europe, but they also provided the impetus 
for a remarkable development in military thought in Germany. Starting with 
Scharnhorst, reaching its zenith with the profundities (and obscurities) of Clausewitz, 
German military thought was further influenced by the elder Moltke and reached a 
dead end in the concepts of Count Alfred von Schlieffen. The author did not have 
the opportunity to revise this essay for publication during his lifetime. The only 
editing has been to eliminate obvious inaccuracies and to insure grammatical clarity, 
Herbert Rosinski (1903-1962) was born and educated in Germany. He taught at 
the German Naval Staff College and left Germany in 1936, a victim of Nazi 
persecution. For the remainder of his Jife, he lived in England and the United States. 
He is author of The German Army and Power and Human Destiny. in addition to 
many artiales published in the United States and abroad. Ed. 
SCHARNHORST TO SCHLIEFFEN: 
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 




At the same time that in France 
Jomini reassembled the various strands 
of the French School in his interpreta­
tion of Napoleon1s unprecedente:d series 
of overwhelming successes, a new school 
of military thought arose in Prussia 
under the leadership and guidance of 
Scharnhorst; comprising, together with 
himself and Clausewitz, two other mili­
tary thinkers, well known and highly 
esteemed in their own day, but long 
buried in complete oblivion from which 
they have been rescued only during the 
last few years: F.K. von Lossow and 
Ruhle von Lilienstern.' 
The peculiar characteristic of the 
German school was its combination of 
wid e practical experience with a 
Copyright @ 1976 by l\ichard P. Stebbins 
strongly pronounced philosophical 
spirit, reflecting the double influence of 
Napoleon's revolution of strategy as 
well as the deep speculative tendencies 
of German thought in this, its classical 
age. With Scharnhorst the practical 
aspect p redominated; his wide acquaint­
ance with contemporary literature 
(hardly philosophy) served only as a 
general stimulus and leaven. In Lossow 
and Ruhle a dilettante acquaintance 
with philosophy led partly to excessive 
skepticism and partly to speculative 
aberrations, without theoretical or prac� 
tical value. Only in Clausewitz, at once a 
passionate soJdier, consuming himself all 
his life in the vain quest for a sphere of 
activity commensurate to his high gifts 
and aspfrations, and a natural.born 
theorist, a profound grasp both of the 
87
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Review Article 
The American Revolution 
John Adams, the sage of colonial 
America, raised three questions in 1815: 
"Who shall write the history of the 
American Revolution? Who can write 
it? Who will ever be able to write it?" 
Page Smith, an eminent 20th century 
historian, has answered the challenge of 
these questions by producing a mam­
moth two*volume tome.* It is a formi­
dable accomplishment and reveals just 
about everything that anyone would 
want to know about the American 
Revolution. 
At this time when the book market is 
flooded with a plethora of books, arti­
cles, and monographs on the American 
Revolution, the first natural reaction by 
anyone reasonably familiar with this 
period in American history will be to 
ask: "Why st!ll two more volumes on 
the Revolution?" But one should not be 
Intimidated, for this work takes on a 
new dimension as Professor Smith un­
folds his brilliant and colorful narrative. 
The first part of A New Age Now Begins 
is largely social and cultural history 
describing the emergence of colonial 
America's consciousness of being 
uniquely uAmericanu and tracing the 
slow and unrelenting drift toward inde­
pendence, and the remaining portions 
*Smith, Page. A New Age Now Begins: ll
People's History of the American Revolution 





deal largely with military and political 
events, 
The author, a professional historian 
of high standing, a longtime scholar of 
early American history and culture, 
includes among his many publications 
the highly acclaimed two-volume biog­
raphy of John Adams. His leitmotif as a 
historian is that utha truth of an event is 
to be found in the full and careful 
telling of it-that ... the event, properly 
told contains its own interpretation," In 
his latest work he carries out this maxim 
unreservedly. 
Page Smith subtitles his monumental 
work A People's History of the Ameri­
can Revolution because he has con­
cluded that the Revolution was essen­
tially a people's movement. He stresses 
the fact that the Revolution, as John 
Adams wrote, took place in the 11hearts 
and minds" of Americans long before 
the direct, revolutionary action hap­
pened. This is the main theme of his 
narrative, and he proceeds to trace this 
development in the early chapters on 
life in colonial America. Professor 
Smith
1 
master historian that he is, gives 
an incisive interpretation of this first 
popular movement of modern times: 
The fact was that nothing like it 
has happened before in modern 
history-the movement of a whole 
people, or enough of them to 
make a revolution, to assert them� 
selves on the stage of world his• 
tory .... The colonists were doing 
something so new in human 
experience that they could only 
explain it in terms of something 117
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their own destinies, a new under• 
standing of the relations between 
the governors and the governed 
developed, a new sense of the 
po ten tialitie, that lay in ordinary 
men and women 1 a new appreci­
ation of possibilities of a better 
life for people in every continent 
and every nation. 
And finally, he adds: "If we can under­
stand our proper relation to the Ameri­
can Revolution, I believe we will be 
much better able to cope with the often 
demoralizing and confusing world in 
which we live today. 11 
Hi s last chapter "Nevus Ordo 
Seclorum, n which is an impressive sum• 
mary of his 1,814 pages of history, 
merits a careful reading and will be 
welcomed by all for its retrospection. 
Because the story of our American 
Revolution has been treated by Smith as 
all body and soul, it merits a permanent 
place in the personal library of every 
naval officer at sea or at h ome. Reading 
a few chapters, such as the ones on 
Arnold's March, the Boston Massacre, or 
Bunker Hill, will easily whet the appe• 
tite for a complete reading of this 
impressive work. 
When the reenactment of the battle 
at Concord Bridge took place in April 
1975, a sign fluttered over the festivities 
which read: "The Revolution is not 
over. n The words have deep meaning for 
the revolution indeed is not over-and 
the United States must continue to give 
it impetus and direction. America must 
reawaken itself to what President Fotd 
called the "American concept and ful­
fillment of liberty that have truly revo­
lutionized the world." Reading these 
volumes will be helpful in stimulating 
this revival, for Professor S mith has 
successfully recreated and revivified the 
era of the American Revolution-the 
People's Revolution. 
AUGUST C. MILLER, JR. 
Naval War College 
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Binkin, Martin, and Record, Jeffrey. 
Where Does the Marine Corps Go 
From Here? Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1976. 93pp. 
This study examines the U.S. Marine 
Corps to determine its role in current 
and future U-S. defense requirements_ 
Binkin and Record believe the Marine 
Corps with an amphibious assault capa­
bility is necessary but that there should 
be changes in the Corps' posture and 
mission orientation. Their findings are 
that the Marine Corps is not organized 
to meet the likeliest threats to our 
national interests; that its air arm re­
quires too large a proportion of the 
Marine Corps' budget; and that to main­
tain the present size of the Corps, many 
people who do not fit the "good men" 
category m ust be accepted. 
After presenting their critical find­
ings the authors make the following 
recommendations: 
1. Retain only four regiments with
associated air, and structured primarily 
for amphibious warfare. 
2. Transfer one BLT from the Pa­
cific to bolster U.S- capabilities in the 
Middle East. 
3. Sharply reduce the size of the
Marines' tactical air capability. 
4- Disband most of the Marine Corps
Reserve. 
Should these recommendations be 
adopted there would still be a question 
of what to do with the remaining 
Marine personnel. The au tho rs offer 
four possibilities: 
L Reduce USMC personnel ceiling 
to reflect the new structure as presented 
in the four recommendations stated 
above. A personnel strength of 112,000 
would result. 
2. Assign the Marine Corps ground
responsibility in Asia presently borne by 
the Army. Corps personnel strength 
here would be 175,000. 
3. Give Marines the assignment as
the U.S. quick reaction force, thus 
replacing the Army's 82d Airborne Divi­
sion. A Corps of 142,000 would result. 
121
War College: Summer 1976 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
122
Naval War College Review, Vol. 29 [1976], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss3/28
123
War College: Summer 1976 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
124
Naval War College Review, Vol. 29 [1976], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss3/28
125
War College: Summer 1976 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
126
Naval War College Review, Vol. 29 [1976], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss3/28
127
War College: Summer 1976 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
128
Naval War College Review, Vol. 29 [1976], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss3/28
129
War College: Summer 1976 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
130
Naval War College Review, Vol. 29 [1976], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss3/28
131
War College: Summer 1976 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
132
Naval War College Review, Vol. 29 [1976], No. 3, Art. 28
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss3/28
133
War College: Summer 1976 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976
130 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 
the military, but businessmen are more 
hostile toward Socialist and Communist 
governments in less-developed countries 
than other elites. 
Against thil, sort of intriguing point 
and counterpoint there is a strong and 
revealing analysis of the business and 
military press relative to U.S. interven­
tion in nine postwar cases which clearly 
establishes the influence potential pro­
•vided by the specialized media. 
Altogether, this book rewards stu­
dent
1 
teacher, and reader alike. It is a 
gold mine of information and insight, 
laboriously prepared and documented. 
It is nice to know that the Advanced 
Research Center of the Naval War Col­
lege had the vision to encourage the 
authors in their scholarly search. 
PROFESSOR ROBERT F. DELANEY 
Naval Wax College 
Russett, Bruce M. and Stepan, Alfred, 
eds. Military Force and American 
Society.. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1973. 37lpp. 
To put it simply this is a book which 
serious students of international rela­
tions and military affairs will want to  
buy and keep in  their per sonal libraries. 
It consists of five articles and an an­
notated research bibliography of some 
175 pages. 
In _, A Personal Statement/' Army 
Maj. James S. Dickey argues cogently 
that there exists a " ... need for con­
tinuous review of the army's missions 
with a v,ew toward reducing, wherever 
possible, their social and political im­
pact" (p. 32). Dickey is upset-and with 
good reason-by the number of clearly 
nonmilitary assignments and missions 
entrusted to the military in recent years. 
While Dickey's essay is largely confined 
to this principal point of the need to 
insure that the military is responsible 
for military missions, he raises a number 
of other, equally intriguing, questions. 
For example, Dickey believes that the 
Army should allow its officers to resign 
for cause when they believe that their 
duties clash with their Constitutional 
loyalty. Such an issue, of course, de­
serves extended treatment, but Dickey 
has introduced the question well. 
A second essay, "The New Military 
Professionalism," by C.L. Abercrombie, 
III and Army Maj. R.H. Alcala, is a 
study of service school instructional 
periods and of service professional 
journals. The chief finding is that to• 
day's professional soldier is becoming 
increasingly more involved in political 
matters. I have no quarrel with the 
quantitative methodology used in this 
essay, but I am not at all persuaded that 
the authors ever came to grips with 
what they mean by "political." In fact, 
as I read the essay, it seems as though 
the authors have tried almost des­
perately to segregate supposedly "mili• 
tary" from supposedly "political" 
matters-something very hard to do in 
theory and (it seems to me, at least) 
impossible tc do in practice. 
In a third article, Jong Ryool Lee 
contends that " ... a high defense 
priority is likely to lead to increased 
foreign commitments and to hurt sound 
economic growth as well" (p. 62). In 
fact, the article deserves a lengthy treat­
ment, both because of its conclusions 
and because of its quantitative tech­
niques (chiefly, multidimensional 
scaling and factor analysis). The author 
has marshaled a great number of data, 
and he uses them convincingly-except 
in the case of his impressions of national 
needs as perceived by Presidents. The 
use of content analysis to judge such 
matters seems to me to be highly 
unreliable if only because a difference 
often exil,ts between what decision­
makers say the policy is (or, declaratory 
policy) and what policy really is (or, the 
actual policy). Content analysis simply 
cannot provide for this, and, on this 
count, I think the article-which is 
otherwise absorbing-begins to falter. 
Wayne Moyer's article ;,, an effort to 
use multiple-regression analysis (and 134
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